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SUMMARY 
The purpose of the essay is to critically discuss and analyse the right to development as an 
individual and a collective right, and or both at national as well as at the international level. 
The main objective being to ascertain whether there is .distinct dichotomy between the right 
to development as an individual and a collective right. 
Having critically analysed the right to development as an individual and a collective right 
or both, I attempted to critically discuss both the active and passive subjects of the right 
- so-called right-holders and duty-bearers respectively, at national as well as at 
international level. 
The juridical status of the right has been critically examined. It is clear that the right is 
legally binding on all states. The right is universally recognised as a human right enjoying 
international legal status. 
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1 
A CRITICAL DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AS AN 
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RIGHT 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this essay is to examine and analyse the nature of the right to development as an 
individual and/or collective right critically, in order to: 
• determine whether or not there is a distinct dichotomy between the right to development 
as an individual and a collective right, and 
• identify the right-holders (active subjects) and real right-bearers (passive subjects) of this 
right. 
The nature of the Right to Development as a human right, whether individual or collective, is the 
subject of an ongoing debate, which is shrouded in uncertainty. On the one hand, there are 
several academic commentators who strongly argue that the right to development, if it exists at 
all, must be primarily or exclusively an individual right1 because the right of the state to 
development is a right of a different kind (see 1. below). Another category of academic 
commentators insists that the right to development is exclusively a collective right with the state 
as subject (see 2. below).2 Other authors argue that the concept of the right to development is 
both an individual and a collective right (see 3. below).3 
Broadly speaking, there are four schools of thought regarding the right to development as:-
• 
• 
• 
• 
exclusively an individual right (industrialised states); 
a collective right of peoples (internal dimension); 
collective right of state as well as an individual right (external dimension), and 
both an individual and collective human right (internal dimension) . 
The right to development was originally conceived as one of the human rights of individuals. 
Garcia-Amador refers to the Philadelphia Declaration of the International Labour Organization 
Conference of May 1944, as authority for a remote expression of this right at the individual 
level.4 The origin of the right to development has also been linked to the developing world, when 
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the Group of 77 adopted the Declaration of Algiers in 1967, which described the right in terms 
of a collective "peoples right" within the framework of a "New International Economic Order".5 
The internal dimension of the right to development supposes that the collectivity is comprised 
ofindividuals, who remain the central subject of the right, while the external dimension supposes 
that the right to development is a collective right of the state and an individual right analogous 
to the right to self-determination. The critical discussion of the right to development as an 
individual human right and a collective right is intended to reveal who the subjects of the right 
to development- the so-called active subjects of the right or right-holders are, and to identify the 
duty-bearers or passive subjects of the right to development. 
1. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT 
This section of the essay recounts the views of some of the most well-known authorities in the 
field. Garcia-Amador, Espiell, Donelly and Rich have all presented arguments in favour of the 
concept of the right to development as an individual human right. The emphasis on the 
individual aspects of the right rather than the collective aspect is typical of the approach popular 
in the West, which regards municipal law as the starting point (instead of public international 
law) and focuses on the realisation of the individual's right to development as a human right. 
The Philadelphia Declaration affirms that "all human beings" irrespective of race, creed or sex 
have the right to pursue both their material well-being and spiritual freedom in conditions of 
freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.6 Sometime after this 
conference, the right to development continued to be conceived as a human right of the 
individual and was implied in some of the rights enumerated in post-war universal and regional 
instruments. 7 
During the next stage of the evolution of the right to development, the concept was again 
described as a human right attaching to the individual. The Chief Justice of Senegal, Keba 
M'Baye, couched the concept in these terms in his first lecture series to the 1972 study session 
of the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg.8 
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Garcia-Amador9 quotes Espiell with approval to the effect that recognition of the existence of a 
human right to development may follow from a systematic interpretation of the International 
Covenants and other conventions, declarations and resolutions which proclaim and protect the 
socio-economic rights of individuals. For Espiell, 10 the right to development is an individual 
human right similar to the right to meet, to strike, and to unionize. These individual rights 
belong to each person and are distinguished from other collective human rights in that they can 
be implemented only by the agreement of many wills. According to him, the right to 
development would not pose any problem when analysed as an individual human right to 
development. He argues that the right to development would be an individual right in its 
beginning and its end, and a collective right in its implementation. 11 Thus, seeing the right to 
development as an individual right belonging to all individual human beings, does not mean that 
there is no further scope for the collective aspect in the implementation phase. 
Espiell states that the right to development as an individual right has not yet achieved 
classification as an independent right. Rather, it is the consequence of domestic and international 
recognition of economic, social and cultural rights of man, in particular the right to live, which 
implies the right to live in a full and integral manner. The author expresses his view with regard 
to the right to development as an individual human right as follows: 
" ... this individual right is the necessary outcome of the generic recognition of 
human rights, of their conceptualization resulting from mankind's necessary 
progress and from the means required to accomplish the ultimate end of common 
welfare."12 
Espiell insists that the right to development is an individual human right because the right to full 
development is a consequence of mankind's unanimous acceptance of the right to live. It is the 
basis of the collective right of states and communities to development. Nevertheless, the 
community cannot impose upon its members the ideas of development which the members have 
not yet accepted freely and spontaneously. 13 In part, this explains why he is adamant that the 
right should be regarded as an individual right. Yet, he concedes that it is when the right to 
development is considered as a collective and an individual right at the same time, that the idea 
of development acquires its true meaning.14 
The recognition of the right to development as an individual right implies the imposition of 
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obligations on the state, collective persons or public entities and on the international community 
to promote and protect human rights, both regionally and universally. 15 The right to live and to 
develop may be held by groups, but are quite explicitly the rights of the individuals. Donnelly 
acknowledges this fact and states that there is no conceptual problem even in the African 
Charter's clear and explicit distinction between human and peoples' rights. He regards human 
rights as individual rights. 16 
Roland Rich17has identified an important distinction between the right to self-determination and 
the right to development. While many commentators refer to the right of self-determination as 
a precondition for the enjoyment of individual human rights, the right to development is widely 
said to be a right of peoples and, simultaneously, a right of individuals. 18 
With reference to Abi-Saab's report on the right to development at the Hague Workshop, where 
a distinction was made between the individual and collective right of development, Garcia-
Amador remarks as follows: 
"If the right to development as an individual does not take us far, we have to fall 
back on the alternative of the right to development as a collective right."19 
Garcia-Amador argues that this remark does not display preference for the collectivity over the 
individual, but conveys that much can be achieved for the individual by considering the right to 
development as a collective right as a matter of legal policy. The Covenants attach the right to 
development to individuals, as recognised in post-war general, regional treaties and other non-
conventional instruments. A right to development which goes beyond what has been achieved 
by the two UN Covenants on Human Rights would be a collective right to development.20 
Resolution 39/46, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979, two years after the 
Commission on Human Rights called for a study on the international dimension of the right to 
development, emphasises that equality of opportunity for development is the prerogative of 
nations and individuals within nations.21 In 1985 the notion of the right to development was 
given further impetus by the UN General Assembly and its Special Committees by way of a 
series of resolutions intended to advance this right as a human right because the central purpose 
of development has been the realisation of the individual human person's potentialities in 
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harmony with the community.22 Implicit in this purpose is the idea that the human person is the 
subject and not the object of development.23 
The Charter of the Organisation of Amefican States (OAS), as amended by the Protocol of 
Buenos Aires, contains regulations with clear references to the right to development as an 
individual right. Article 43 (a) of the Charter provides: 
"All human beings, without distinction as to race, sex, nationality, creed, or social 
condition, have a right to material well-being and to their spiritual development, 
under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic 
security. "24 
This regional international instrument (OAS) treats the right to development as a right of the 
human person. 25 The right to development as an individual right has also been advanced as an 
individual human right by U.N. General Assembly resolutions relating to the New International 
Economic Order.26 
Criticism against this approach includes the point that international human rights, by creating 
rights on the international level which need to be enforced against the state to which the 
individual belongs, do not create the means by which states may be held accountable for 
violations in their domestic spheres. In the case of developing states, individual claims to this 
effect may contribute to weaken the state even further.27 One may ask whether such an atomistic 
approach reflects the extent to which people live in communities. 
2. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AS A COLLECTIVE RIGHT OF PEOPLES 
(INTERNAL DIMENSION) 
Some academic commentators and authors hold a strong view that the right to development is 
not an individual human right, but a collective right of peoples since it has collective orientation 
rather than individual orientation. Would its classification as a collective right pose a threat to 
individual rights or cause a conflict between individual and collective rights? 
Authors such as Crawford and Sieghard have identified several categories of collective rights in 
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general human rights texts.28 The rights are listed as follows: 
1. self-determination and equality of rights; 
2. rights relating to international peace and security; 
3. permanent sovereignty over natural resources; 
4. rights in relation to development; 
5. rights in relation to the environment; and 
6. rights of minorities. 
Crawford has added a seventh category of collective rights to Sieghard's list, namely the right 
of groups to existence. Both authors list the right to development as a collective right with 
peoples as subjects of the right.29 Crawford declares that the seven categories are collective 
rights which have been "sufficiently clearly formulated in terms of collective rights", and have 
achieved recognition in at least one international human rights instrument in treaty form. 30 
The Banjul Charter is the human rights instrument in which the right to development is 
recognized as a collective right of peoples. The Organisation of African Unity adopted the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights which was approved in January 1981 by the 
OAU Ministerial Conference in Banjul, the Gambia.31 The emphasis of the instrument is on the 
protection of both individual human rights and rights of peoples against alien domination. As 
for the right to development, Article 22 reads: 
1. "All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and 
cultural development with regard to their freedom and identity 
and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. 
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure 
the exercise of the right to development." 
Peoples have this right and the state bears the concomitant responsibility. Crawford treats the 
possible differences between a right to development as a right of peoples or a right of states in 
the same way as the differences with regard to the right of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources. He concludes that the right to development is as well integrated into the body of 
international practice as is the right of permanent sovereignty. He treats the right to development 
as a collective right of peoples and of states and make no distinction between the two.32 
Nevertheless, by implication, he confirms the notion of the right to development as a collective 
right of states against other states at the international level. 
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Kunig has argued that the right to development ought to be seen as a collective right of peoples, 
based on the ground that development is necessarily a collective venture and process, and also 
because an individual cannot develop all by himself.33 Since many development processes or 
activities require collectivity, I go along with this view in part. The right could be exercised 
collectively by peoples to improve their health and the education of their children and of future 
generations. The provision of sufficient schools, clinics and hospitals, roads leading to and from 
these institutions, and possibly the provision of the effective means of communication would 
demand collective action. Nevertheless, at the international level, a state possessing the right 
against others may construct dams or roads and devise tourism projects without the involvement 
of other states. Similarly, at national level, the subjects of the right to development (citizens and 
peoples), may exercise this right individually. The owner of a small-holding may improve and 
expand it for the purpose of vegetables and fruits production all by himself. Moreover, the fact 
that collective action is required to realise a right does not mean that the right is a collective right. 
In 1981 the UN General Assembly declared the right to development to be an inalienable human 
right. It found the notion of the right as a collective right unacceptable, based on the ground that 
as a collective right it poses a threat to traditional individual rights.34 Moreover, there was 
concern that a conflict between individual and collective rights could be fuelled by classification 
of the right to development as a collective right. Triggs argues that the first criticism has been 
countered by the U.N. General Secretary's argument that the individual and collective 
dimensions of the right to development are complementary, and that the second criticism has 
been met by the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, which stresses that all human 
rights are indivisible and interdependent.35 The criticism that recognition of collective rights 
(peoples' rights) would endanger traditional human rights boils down to a misunderstanding of 
the interdependent relationship between collective and individual rights.36 It follows that the 
right to development, exercised at the national level or in its internal dimension, is a collective 
right of peoples held with respect to the state which they inhabit, while individuals are the 
ultimate primary beneficiaries of development processes. 
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3. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AS A COLLECTIVE RIGHT (EXTERNAL 
DIMENSION) AND COMBINATIONS OF THIS VIEWPOINT 
This section will indicate that states may and do hold rights on the international level and may 
be the subjects of the right to development. Authors and commentators such as de Vey Mestdagh 
and Garcia-Amador strongly support the external dimension of the right to development as a 
collective right of states at the international level. Bedjaoui's viewpoint is that the right to 
development is considered as a right of peoples and of states at the international level. There is 
a general consensus among scholars that the right to development of states, viewed as a collective 
right, is the right of states at the international level against other states. 
States ought not to be seen as holders of individual human rights. 
3.1 A COLLECTIVE RIGHT OF STATES (EXTERNAL DIMENSION) AND AN 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT 
Garcia-Amador37 states that the distinction between the right to development as an 
individual right and as a collective right becomes relevant when we consider the content 
of the right in each case. As a collective right, and more particularly a collective right 
of states, the right to development shows a content different from that of an individual 
right.38 As a collective right of states, this right reflects the following aspects: 
1. The right to development rn:ay be claimed erga omnes by a state which is "master 
in its own house" and is opposable, by the possessor state, against all others. 39 
2. The right to development may be claimed by a state, the active protagonist in 
international relations, against other states. This right may be exacted by the 
claimant-state not only from other states but also from the entire international 
community.40 
Viewed as a collective right of states, the right to development is opposable erga omnes 
by a state against others and the international community.41 It becomes clear, therefore, 
that only at the international level may the right to development be ascribed to states. 
Only in the international system is it practicable for a state to exact its right to 
development as a collective right against others. Advocates of the right to development 
as a collective right of states warn that recognition of a right of states on the national 
level could be abused to justify human rights violations committed in the quest for 
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development.42 It is de Vey Mestdagh's opinion, for example, that the right to 
development should not be seen as a material human right of individuals, or of states at 
all, on account of the dangers which inhere in the idea of ascribing human rights to states. 
To his mind, the right to development as an individual right is merely an aggregate and, 
therefore, a wasteful multiplication of human rights; as a collective right, the right is 
available only to states in the international system.43 States are not ascribed human rights 
at the national level, for states may abuse their international right to development to 
distract world attention from infringements on the human rights of individuals. States 
cannot be holders of human rights for the historic political function of human rights is to 
protect the individuals against certain abuses by states. States may use their human rights 
to infringe the human rights of the individuals and refuse to provide certain minimum 
goods, services and equal opportunities to all individuals.44 Donnelly states that in the 
modem era, this vital historic political function has been performed more widely and 
more effectively by human rights than any social practice.45 Donnelly blames the present 
state of international law and politics for the absence of a meaningful national dimension 
for a collective right to development in practice. 46 He declares that the danger of a right 
to development of states could be reduced if restricted to a right of states in international 
relations, (i.e. a right of the state against other states and the international community). 
Okafor has pointed out that de Vey Mestdagh does not advance any reason why the right 
to development cannot be a collective right of peoples.47 Nevertheless, the communist 
perspective may explain this oversight: that individuals and peoples can attain 
development only through political, economic, and social progress of the state. 
When deliberating on the right to development in 1986 experts from Scandinavian 
countries took the position that the right to development be commonly described as a 
collective right pertaining to states and nations.48 The Netherlands found the notion of 
the right to development as a collective right acceptable provided that collectivity is 
recognized and understood as made up of individuals.49 
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3.2 A COLLECTIVE RIGHT OF STATES AND PEOPLES, AND AN INDIVIDUAL 
HUMAN RIGHT 
Mohammed Bedjaoui's viewpoint is that the right to development is considered as a right 
of peoples and of states (at the international level).50 He states that the right to 
development cannot be an individual human right unless it is first a right of peoples or 
of states. Only a collective and community approach to the right to development as a 
collective right of states at international level51 will enable us to identify the real nature 
of the development problem and the appropriate solutions to be applied to the 
international problem of underdevelopment. 52 
Bedjaoui confirms that the right to development is a human right since the individual is 
the ultimate primary beneficiary of the international legal norms, and that development 
is nonetheless proclaimed within a defined framework operating among states. Therefore 
the right to development cannot be claimed by the individual against the international 
community or other states, unless claimed through the individual's own state. The 
citizens' right to development is best secured by the state at international level. Thus, the 
right is presented as a collective right of state held against or with respect to other states 
or the international community. 53 
3.3 THE RIGHT AS A HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHT (EXTERNAL DIMENSION) 
The emphasis of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is on the protection 
of both individual human rights and rights of peoples against alien domination. Article 
22 provides: 
"1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, 
social and cultural development with due regard to 
their freedom and identity and in the equal 
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. 
2. States shall have the duty, individually or 
collectively to ensure the exercise of the right to 
development." 
The inclusion of a right to development in the Banjul Charter is a significant indicator of 
the importance with which the African States regard the right. 54 The right is seen as a 
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collective right of African States on the international level, as well as an individual right 
of each African State which may be exacted from others by the possessor state. The 
relevant provision in the African Charter is also open to the interpretation that African 
states are under an obligation to co-operate for the purpose of encouraging development, 
and that all states are called upon to co-operate to implement the right. 
A dispute which arose between Botswana and Bophutatswana in 1981 illustrates the 
external dimension of the international right to development.55 The erst-while 
Bophuthatswana Government informed the Botswana Government that it intended to 
construct a big dam along the Molopo river at Disaneng Village, District Molopo. The 
notification was done in the spirit of friendly relations between states and their co-
operation towards the improvement of the world economy. The Botswana Government 
refused to hold negotiations with the Bophuthatswana authorities on the ground of lack 
of recognition of the homeland regime. The Masire administration sent a message to 
the South African Foreign Affairs Department that the negotiations be conducted by the 
latter. All efforts by the Bophuthatswana Government to commence negotiations failed, 
and on that ground the Bophuthatswana Government proceeded with the project as 
planned. After the construction of the dam, the Botswana Government claimed that the 
project constituted a breach of its right to development, because this partial blockade of 
the natural watercourse was partially depriving it of the water resources necessary for the 
development of Botswana. Although there was no political and administrative co-
operation between these two states and the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 
the matter was later resolved. Fortunately, the Batlharo Ba Ga Masibi Tribal Authority 
Council, owing to proper consultation, adopted a resolution in terms of which the erst-
while Bophuthatswana Government was authorised to construct the dam provided that 
the residents received sufficient compensation and were resettled at the state's expense 
(transport and other removal services). 
The dispute may have provided an opportunity to enforce the right at national level 
(internal dimension of the right to development). The residents of Disaneng Village 
could have instituted a claim against their national government, as subjects and 
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beneficiaries of the right. This theme will be developed under 4. and 5. below. 
4. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AS BOTH AN INDIVIDUAL AND 
COLLECTIVE RIGHT (INTERNAL DIMENSION) 
There are some authors, academics, commentators and jurists who see the right to development 
as both an individual and a collective right belonging to individuals and all peoples. The Dakar 
Conference concluded along similar lines. The English text of the conclusion is contained in the 
UN Secretary-General's Report of 1979.56 In this report, the Secretary-General stated that the 
enjoyment of the right to development involves a careful balancing of the interests of the 
collectivities on the one hand, and those of the individual on the other. The report states that it 
would be a mistake to regard the right to development as necessarily attaching only at one level 
exclusively.57 
The African Jurists regarded the right as both individual and collective at the 1978 Hague 
Workshop, held underthe auspices of the Hague Academy of International Law and the United 
Nations University. They concluded that the creditors of the right in question are individuals, 
peoples and states. Thus the jurists' conclusion is reflective of the logic that the right to 
development is both individual and collective. Later (in 1981) the jurists' position was 
incorporated into the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples Rights. To indicate the 
individual and collective characteristics of the right, the relevant articles in Chapter One, (under 
the heading: "Human and Peoples' Rights") use expressions such as "every individual" and "all 
peoples". 58 
According to article 20 paragraph 1 of the African Charter all peoples have the right to existence. 
They have an inalienable right to self-determination to freely determine their political status, and 
to pursue their economic and social development according to their own chosen policy. Article 
22 paragraph 1 attaches the right of economic, social and cultural development to the 
collectivities (all peoples). Paragraph 2 of article 22 places states under separate and collective 
obligations to ensure the exercise of the right to development by individuals and all peoples. 
It is clear that the African Charter recognizes, guarantees, and attaches the right to development 
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to individuals. Article 2 proclaims: 
"every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind 
such as .... " 
My assessment of the article is that its text should be understood as saying that all rights 
including peoples' rights provided for in the articles 19 to 24 also belong to individuals. It 
should be borne in mind that the individual cannot exercise the right to self-determination and 
development or existence without the support and cooperation of the group/community to which 
he/she is a member. In order to provide proper protection to the individual, it is necessary to 
recognise those collective centres utilized by individuals to express their rights. 
While it may be so that the African Charter attaches peoples' rights such as self-determination 
and development both to individuals and collectivities, the Charter is not too generous in 
conferring rights on individuals that will allow them to assert collective rights such as the right 
to development. It remains a mystery why the drafters of the Charter did not include an article 
that delineated the right to development more clearly. It would appear as if they preferred the 
right to be implied from the article which attaches the right to existence to all peoples. I would 
suggest an article with the following wording: 
"Every individual and all peoples shall have a right to development, by virtue of 
which they shall determine their political status, and pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development in a general condition favourable and conducive to the 
exercise of a right to development." 
Article 20(1) which attaches the right to existence to all peoples in clear terms, serves as a basis 
for this argument. 
The Report and Draft Seoul Declaration of 1985 drawn up by the International Law 
Association's First Subcommittee formulates the principle relating to the right to development 
together with, and on the basis of the general principle of economic sovereignty.59 Makarczyk 
describes the link as follows: 
"The principle of permanent sovereignty is based on the right to self-
determination of peoples, which is one of the foundations of the progressive 
development of a right to development of individuals and peoples as a human 
right, recognized by international law, a right which should be respected by all 
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states and which is based on the concept of human dignity. "60 
Makarczyk 61 states that the iunctim between the right to development, and self-determination 
and human rights was introduced to the ILA due to its links with the work of the UN Human 
Rights Commission. The right to development was taken out of its strictly state context on the 
basis of the notion that it is a right of individuals and peoples grounded in international treaties. 
The text of the Seoul Declaration reads: 
"The right to development is a principle of public international law in general 
and of human rights law in particular, and is based on the self-determination of 
peoples. "62 
Makarczyk states, further, that the right to development as a human right means that all 
individuals and all peoples should freely partake of the fruits of their toil both individually and 
in common (collectively) through the state in order to implement the provisions of articles 5 5 and 
56 of the UN Charter. 63 The Seoul Declaration advocates a right of individuals and peoples, and 
it imposes certain concrete obligations and duties on states both with regard to their internal and 
international policies as is the case with the Banjul Charter. 
Makinson 64 states that the right to development and cultural identity are often presented as borne 
by both individuals and collectivities, with the emphasis on peoples' rights, such as the right of 
peoples to self-determination, of minorities, of groups to existence etc.65 
Bulajic 66 accepts that the right to development has been recognized by the UN as the inalienable 
human right of every person and all peoples, but sees the developing countries as the main area 
of application. The author claims that equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative 
both of the nations and individuals who comprise nations. The author says that as in the case 
of the right to self-determination, the right to development is both an individual as well as a 
collective right.67 I disagree with Bulajic's view that the human right to development belongs 
particularly to every person in developing countries. To my mind, the right should not be 
restricted to developing countries' peoples, but should attach to all peoples in developing, and 
underdeveloped countries, or peoples who want to attain self-determination and independence, 
peoples whose right to development are at stake or affected by development processes or groups 
who are excluded from development activities e.g. women. Their human right to development 
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requires guaranteed protection. The basis of my argument is that development refers to constant 
comprehensive improvement and promotion of the well-being of the entire population, whether 
located in the USA, England, Germany or in less developed countries (measured in terms of the 
yardsticks of economic growth, per capita income, literacy etc) for example African countries 
such as Malawi, Botswana or Zimbabwe. 
In 1981, 1982 and again in 1984, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed the notion of the right 
to development as an inalienable right to development belonging to individuals and peoples.68 
The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development (Article 1 (1)) defines the right to 
development as follows: 
"The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which 
every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, 
and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized." 
Article 1 paragraph 1 indicates that the right to development is both individual and collective, 
attaching to every person and all peoples at both national and international levels. The human 
right to development implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, 
which includes the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural 
resources and wealth.69 When discussing the right to development, the right to self-determination 
surfaces because the latter is a forerunner to the former.70 It is asserted by Bedjaoui that the right 
to development flows from the right to self-determination and is of the same kind. If we accept 
this contention, it follows that the right to development is one of the collective rights belonging 
to individuals and all peoples. 
It is strongly and convincingly argued by Bulajic that the right to development as a human right 
must include the right of every individual to benefit fairly from so-called constant and 
comprehensive development in society.71 The right could be seen as a right that requires joint 
action by communities or groups of individuals working for a common goal in a spirit of 
solidarity. 72 
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In: conclusion, an individual person should be seen as a subject of the right to development under 
international law, otherwise, the right to development could be regarded merely as a collective 
right of a people (nation) or state, and the individual as the object of the right.73 At the same 
time, the right to development is regarded as an independent human right and as a prerequisite 
for the enjoyment of other human rights, and could also be seen for both individuals and states 
as a right of access to the means necessary for the realization of human rights defined in 
international instruments. 74 
Having critically analysed the right to development as an individual right and as a collective right 
of peoples, as well as a collective right of states, it has to be reiterated that the individual and 
collective dimensions of the right to development cannot be entirely disjoined as there is an 
interdependent relationship between the two dimensions. The theme of the next section is the 
active subjects of the right. Who are the active subjects of an individual dimension as well as 
a collective dimension of the right to development? 
5. THE SUBJECTS OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 
An analysis of the active subjects of the right to development depends on whether the right is 
viewed as an individual human right, a collective right of peoples (peoples' right), a collective 
right of states or as an individual right (external dimension of the right to development). An 
analysis of the holders of the right to development depends on whether the right is viewed as 
belonging to individuals, groups of peoples or all peoples, states, minorities, communities, 
NGO's, national organisations or international communities and organisations. 
If the right to development is viewed as an individual right, the active subjects of the right are 
individuals. Thus the assertion implies a need to recognize the right to development of every 
human being, without any distinction on the basis of sex, religion, race, ideology or nationality. 74 
If we accept the view that the right to development is an individual human right it is obvious that 
the central subjects, active participants and primary beneficiaries of the right are all human 
beings (all individuals). This right is held equally against one's national government and the 
international community. De Waart expresses the same view.75 
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In 1984 the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to Development76 were almost 
in full agreement in recognizing both individuals and peoples as the holders of the right to 
development. During its ninth session, the following definition of the right to development as 
a human right emerged as a possible working basis: 
"The right to development is the inalienable human right by virtue of which every 
individual, and all peoples pursuant to the right of self-determination, are entitled 
to participate in, contribute to and enjoy a comprehensive political, economic, 
social and cultural order, in which all human beings are fully respected and can 
be fully realized."77 
After prolonged discussion the Working Group recognized by consensus that the human being 
is the central subject of the right to development and that any development policy should have 
the individual as the main participant in and primary beneficiary of development.78 
Viewed as a collective right of peoples the active subjects of the right to development, are 
peoples who hold the right against their national governments. Viewed as a collective right in 
Municipal Law, the potential holders or active subjects of the right to development are 
collectivities such as provinces, regions, districts, municipalities and communities whose 
development must be promoted, encouraged and protected. 79 
When the right to development is considered in its collective dimension in international law, the 
subjects of the right to development include all states, particularly developing or underdeveloped 
countries, all peoples, and international communities. 80 Large organisations, non-governmental 
organisations acting as agents of governments, international organisations and transnational 
corporations are also regarded as subjects of the right at international level. 
Bedjaoui insists that the right to development has an effective meaning and content, only when 
it has a state as its subject and beneficiary at the international level.81 According to the author 
the right to development cannot be an individual human right unless it is first a right of states. 
Thus it may be argued that states are first-holders of the right later to be transferred to individuals 
as a human right to development. because the author recognizes the individual as the ultimate 
beneficiary of the international legal norms. 82 
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Academic commentators and authors such as De W aart, Rich, Crawford & Sieghard hold the 
view that the right to development has both an individual and a collective dimension. They see 
as the central subjects of, active participants and primary beneficiaries of the collective and 
individual dimensions of the right, all individuals, all peoples and states. 
In his 1979 report, the United Nations Secretary-General expressed the view that individuals, 
collectivities and states are subjects of the right to development.83 This view found wide support 
both in the academic community as well as the public service sector. I support the view, 
provided that states are viewed as passive subjects of this right in the context of rights and 
duties.84 States may be regarded as subjects of the right because states have the right to pursue 
their own economic, social, cultural and political development in an international environment 
conducive to the process of comprehensive and progressive development. A number of 
international and regional organizations make it their business to render financial developmental 
assistance to underdeveloped or developing states, e.g. the Asian Development Bank, 
International Reconstruction and Development Bank and Development Bank of Southern Africa. 
Financial assistance is regarded as the most important factor in the development process. Private 
financial assistance originates from non-profit making institutions, foundations, religious groups, 
large private organisations and international organisations. Government or government 
sponsored institutions may provide public financial assistance. 85 
In bilateral relations financial assistance takes the form of government to government financial 
transfers, whereas international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund and regional development banks 
such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa make financial transfers in the multilateral 
context.86 
The Council of Europe/Parliamentary Assembly, in its 1983 report, states that states are widely 
seen as subjects of the right to development. 87 The report indicates the states may have a right 
to development in the context of rights and duties, and not as a human right of individuals. The 
report of the Council contains echoes of the conclusion reached by the African Jurists in a 
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Conference held in Dakar where it was agreed that the creditors of the right to development are 
individuals, peoples and states. 88 The better and most acceptable view seems to be that the 
holders of the right to development in its individual dimension are individuals, in its collective 
dimension all peoples and states. During the deliberations on the Draft Declaration on the Right 
to Development in 1985 and 1986 prior to the adoption of the 1986 Declaration the Soviet Union 
experts insisted upon recognition of the right of all states and peoples to peaceful, free and 
independent development as the main aspect of the right. 
According to Macalister-Smith, states, peoples, minorities and individuals have been advanced 
and identified as holders or potential holders and beneficiaries of the right to development. 89 The 
subjects of the right to development are thus beneficiaries of the right at both national and 
international levels. Only at international level are states viewed as beneficiaries of any result 
of the right to development. Most proponents of the state as holder of the right to development 
also argue that the right is held by peoples as well, and that internally the primary holders of the 
right are peoples against their states. 90 
Donnelly observes that the right to development appears in most lists of the third generation 
human rights. He further states that individuals, minorities, peoples and states have all been 
identified as holders of the right to development.91 This view is not widely shared by 
commentators. Most of them argue against collective third generation human rights.92 
To sum up: although peoples, minorities, and states (developing or underdeveloped) are 
advanced as subjects and beneficiaries of the right to development, I suggest that the better 
approach would be to regard peoples and states as transitory holders of the collective right in its 
internal and external dimension, and the recipients of the benefits resulting from progressive 
development. The basis of this argument is that individuals are the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
international as well as national legal norms of development. The following practical example 
serves as the basis of the above argument. The South African government may approach other 
states, the international community or international organisations created to encourage realization 
of the right to development, and ask for assistance (such as financial aid and expert knowledge 
in the field of technology, engineering, economics and computer science) in order to put in place 
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development projects (such as construction of large dams, freeways, bridges and the provision 
of houses to disadvantaged individuals or peoples). Here the state is exercising its right to 
development at the international level. If funds/knowledge are made available the South 
African government will receive them in its capacity as temporary subject of the right and 
recipient beneficiary. Once the funds and expert knowledge have been used for the intended 
purpose, individuals are likely to benefit from dams, freeways and houses. 
The above practical example and the argument that the individual human being is the central 
subject of and beneficiary of the right to development are based on one of the most widely quoted 
definitions of the right to development which includes the following: 
• the realization of the potentialities of the human person in harmony with the community 
as the central purpose of development; 
• regarding the human person as central subject and not object of development; 
• respect for human rights, which is fundamental to the development process; 
• full participation of the human person in shaping his own reality, and 
• a degree of individual and collective self-reliance as an integral part of the process of 
development. 93 
6. THE DUTY-BEARERS OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 
The central subjects as well as the primary beneficiaries of the right to development in its internal 
and external dimensions, individual and collective aspects have been analysed in the previous 
section. The objective in this section is to identify the passive subjects of the right to 
development at both national and international levels. As stated above, the analysis of the central 
subjects and beneficiaries of the right to development will depend on whether the right is viewed 
as an individual right or as a collective right of peoples or states. Similarly, the identification of 
the duty-bearers of the right to development will depend on whether the right is seen as an 
individual or collective right or both. 
As an individual right, the recognition of the right to development implies the imposition of 
duties and obligations on the state, collective persons or public entities and the international 
community.94 The obligations result from the principles and norms created for the purpose of 
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promoting and protecting human rights both regionally and internationally.95 
Under municipal law,96 the duty-bearers of the right to development as a collective right are 
states, that is the national governments of developing states and various levels of collectivities 
including corporations. 
At regional level, in Africa, the passive subjects of the collective right to development are all 
African States. The 1981 African Charter, in Article 17(3) provides that the promotion and 
protection of moral and traditional values, that is the right to cultural identity of a collectivity 
recognized by the community, is the duty of the state. According to Article 22(2), states have 
the duty, individually and collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.97 
Okafor considers development to be a right of individuals as well as of peoples.98 As a right of 
individuals, the international duty-bearers are thought to be the United Nations, the developed 
world and the state concerned. As a right of peoples at international level, the bearers of 
obligations are the United Nations and the developed world. The author identifies as bearers of 
obligations to promote development the United Nations, nations of the North and every nation-
state.99 
Included among the duties of states as duty-bearers of the right to development are: the 
formulation, adoption and implementation of a policy framework; legislative and administrative 
measures at national level, and formulation, adoption and implementation of international 
instruments aimed at creating and maintaining national as well as international public and civic 
orders free of obstacles to development. 
It is universally accepted by scholars and governments, that states have the right to formulate, 
internally and internationally, development policies for the purpose of improving the living 
standards of individuals and all peoples. Similarly, states have the duty and primary 
responsibility to ensure that the development process produce the desired results. Every state, 
as a passive subject of the right of development, has a positive duty to its citizens to protect and 
promote their right to development. The U.N. World Summit for Social Development held at 
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Copenhagen from 06 to 12 March 1995 bore this out. Its report states that governments (all 
states) should promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms including the right 
to development bearing in mind the interdependent and mutually reinforcing relationship 
between democracy and respect for human rights, and should make public institutions more 
responsive to the needs of the people by ensuring that decisions are based on accurate data and 
taken with the full participation of those who will be affected. 100 
States have the duty and obligation individually or collectively to ensure the exercise of the right 
to development. 101 States are responsible for the constant improvement of the well-being of the 
entire population and all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation 
in development. 102 It is the responsibility of states to ensure that the benefits resulting from 
development are fairly distributed to the active subjects of the right or those whose rights to 
development are most at stake. States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring 
development and for the purpose of eliminating any possible obstacle of development, and to 
facilitate the full realization of the right to development by formulating international policies for 
this purpose. 103 
It should be noted that Article 2(2) of the Declaration on the Right to Development imposes 
duties on all human beings, individually and collectively, to promote an appropriate economic, 
social, cultural and political development. Article 2(2) attaches the right to all human beings as 
holders of the right and on the other hand imposes duties on individuals as duty-bearers. 
Paul states that those in control of development processes have the duty and obligation to protect 
and promote recognized human rights through development. 104 To achieve this, the development 
actors or controllers should be held accountable to peoples (right-holders) or those whose rights 
and interests in development are most affected. Human persons are the central subjects, active 
participants and primary beneficiaries of the human right to development. 105 The right-holders 
may be prevented from benefiting from development projects or activities if those in control of 
development projects fail to properly carry out their duties and obligations. A project may fail 
if: employment opportunities created by tourism or large scale construction projects go to 
imported labour; peoples whose rights are most at stake because of forced removals and 
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resettlement are not properly compensated, or certain groups are excluded from access to 
resources. The denial of full and effective rights of participation in development process, in 
particular to women, constitutes a violation of fundamental rights central to human rights and 
other basic rights. 106 
7. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 
Opinion has founded the right to development on the United Nations Charter, on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Human Rights Covenants, on the principle of self-
determination and on the right to life. Thus the notion of the right to development is considered 
to be a synthesis of a large number of human rights and even as the totality of the means 
available to make economic and social rights effective for the masses of the people who are 
grievously deprived of them. Jean Rivero shared this view in a paper on human rights and the 
establishment of a NIEO, presented at a meeting of human rights experts in Paris in 1978.107 
The right to development is not just one of the declared human rights, it is a key element of the 
NIEO and an attempt to implement the principal mandate of the United Nations Charter. The 
legal status of the right to development has been the subject of an intensely divisive 
jurisprudential debate among international lawyers. The general trend among scholars and 
lawyers is that for one jurisprudential reason or the other the right to development enjoys 
juridical ranking in contemporary international law. This affirmation of a legal status with 
respect to the right to development is also usually tied up with an affirmation of the legislative 
or quasi-legislative capacity of the U.N. General Assembly and the endorsement of the principles 
of the NIEO as normative requirements of the contemporary law of nations. 108 
Authors such as Espiell, Garcia-Amador and Rich endorse the right to development as a positive 
international legal right. Furthermore, it has been argued that the General Assembly resolutions 
including UNDRD are new sources of the law of nations or evidence of widespread opinio 
juris.109 
It is argued that Article 55 of UN Charter imposes a legal duty on the UN to promote high 
standards of living, full employment, economic and social progress and development, while 
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Article 56 legally binds all Member-States to take joint and separate action in cooperation with 
the UN. It is argued that the right to development (UNDRD) is legally binding on all states 
because the General Assembly resolutions constitute compulsory sources of international law. 
At international level, the right to development is universally recognised as a human right 
enjoying international legal status. 110 
8. SOUTH AFRICA'S RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme is defined as follows: 
"The RDP is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework. It seeks 
to mobilise all our people and our country's resources toward the final eradication 
of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist future."111 
The RDP may be interpreted as a collective right of peoples at national level, in particular those 
whose right to development had been seriously affected by the apartheid system in the form of 
forced removals and resettlement, the creation of separate self-governing territories and 
independent homelands based on racial grounds, and the exclusion of women's full effective and 
active participation in almost all development projects in the name of the development process.112 
Viewed as a collective human right to development, the central subjects or right-holders of the 
RDP should be those whose rights to development have been affected by the apartheid system. 
These right-holders represent the primary beneficiaries of the RDP. All employment 
opportunities created by the RDP projects should benefit them. Ideally, equal employment 
opportunities should be created both in the private and public sectors. Economic and job security 
is, after all, one of the cardinal aspects of development. 
9. CONCLUSION 
Most scholars and Governments agree that the right to development is both an individual and 
collective human right attaching to individuals and all peoples. As a collective right of states, 
the right may be utilised in the course of a state's external relations. 
The African Jurists had long agreed that the right to development is both an individual and 
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collective right of individual human beings and all peoples. The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights recognises that the right is both an individual as well as a collective right, by 
using expressions such as "every individual" and "all peoples". The 1986 Declaration on the 
Right to Development is an international instrument in which the right is seen both as a collective 
and an individual right. 
Individual and collective rights cannot be entirely disjoined. There is no distinct dichotomy 
between the right to development as an individual and collective right. Indeed, the notion of the 
right to development is referred to by some authors as a "two-headed right of individuals and 
peoples." 
Human beings are the central active subjects, participants and holders, and primary beneficiaries 
of the human right to development. 
States viewed as duty-bearers i.e passive subjects of the right to development have the right and 
the duty to formulate and implement a development policy with a view to improve and protect 
the living standards of all peoples. In the South African situation, the state is obliged to 
formulate and implement a national reconstruction and development policy. States have the 
duty, both individually and collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right by creating conditions 
favourable for development processes. 
Those in control of development processes or reconstruction and development projects have the 
duty to protect and promote active and effective local participation, by being responsive to local 
problems. The more decentralised development projects, activities and planning process are, the 
better. Development actors should ensure that women are accorded full and effective 
participation, and that employment opportunities benefit the local community. The 
decentralisation of the RDP in South Africa, in order to ensure that it concentrates on local 
community and answers local problems, is a positive step on the road to the future. 
It is important to dispel the view that the human right to development is a very soft international 
law not yet to be taken seriously as law commanding recognition and respect. Commentators 
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who see the Declaration on the Right to Development as inchoate law should know that the right 
is better perceived as a set of international principles of constitutional proportions calling via 
Article 10 of the Declaration for the creation of an expansive regime of human rights law to be 
applied to many various sectors and kinds of international organisations. 
It should be borne in mind that the right to development is universally recogn.ized by states as 
legal right thus enjoying the status of international law. It is hoped that the enforcement of the 
right will be promoted by the efforts of popular organisations, NGO's, activists, and scholars at 
local, national, and international levels. Once the Working Group on the Right to Development 
has identified obstacles to the implementation of the right, such obstacles have been addressed 
and ways and means of realising the right have been identified, the right will be more easily 
enforceable against all states. 
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